Abstract: Recent results from the hedge fund literature provide evidence that patterns in fund returns suggestive of negative timing ability may in fact be evidence of concave payoff overlay strategies. These strategies increase short-term measures of portfolio performance at the possible expense of increased downside risk in the longer term. While prudential regulations limit access to these overlay strategies for many managed funds, trading activity may generate similar payoffs. We examine this hypothesis using a unique database of high-frequency holdings and transactions from a set of forty successful Australian equity funds, and find that high alpha measures are indeed associated with use of such concave payoff strategies. 
Introduction
Do fund managers add value in excess of the fees that they charge? The conventional wisdom is that they cannot. Following on the seminal work of Jensen (1968) , few empirical studies are able to demonstrate statistically significant evidence that returns exceed those of appropriately chosen passive benchmarks.
1 It would appear from this evidence that stock selection generates little more than commission charges. There appears to be even less evidence that managers can successfully time the market. Funds lose more than the benchmark when the benchmark falls in value, but do not anticipate positive benchmark returns. In other words, the empirical evidence is that fund payoffs are concave relative to benchmark payoffs, and the quadratic term in an extended market model regression is reliably negative for most funds. However, much of this literature is being called into question by results based on information about transactions and holdings. In a close study of fund manager holdings, purchases and sales, Wermers (2000) finds that, in fact, investment managers add value in their purchases and sales.
A recent study by Agarwal and Naik (2004) argues that concave payoff patterns in hedge fund returns result from the use of derivative overlay positions, rather than negative timing ability.
3
Pensions and Investments (May 31, 2004, p.19) .
While derivative overlay positions are more accessible to hedge funds than to other managed funds, it is at least possible that active trading that generates the same payoffs may explain why many mutual funds display return patterns that are concave to benchmarks.
It is certainly reasonable to think that concave payoff patterns result from the use of derivative overlay positions rather than from negative timing ability. The interesting question is: why do fund managers seek portfolio strategies with concave payouts? A recent survey conducted by
Pensions and Investments reveals that derivative overlay strategies are becoming very popular among fund managers. 3 Originally these strategies were conceived of as a conservative approach to risk management, particularly in the case of foreign currency hedging, beta shifting in a portable alpha context, and in various portfolio insurance-type strategies where the objective is to limit downside risk through convex payoff portfolio strategies. However, it is difficult to reconcile concave payoff strategies with a desire to limit risk exposure. Indeed, there is a suggestion in the same survey that many fund managers are turning to overlay strategies as a way of extracting alpha in a strategic asset allocation context and as a creative way to resolve large present funding gaps in defined benefit pension plans.
Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel and Welsh (GISW; 2002) suggest that this performance enhancement may be illusory. It is always possible to devise a zero-net-investment overlay portfolio strategy that can artificially augment the fund's reported Sharpe (1966) ratio. This performance gain comes at the expense of increasing downside risk. They further show that, by 4 Gruber (1996) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) document evidence of a performance-flow relation, where fund flows are disproportionately directed to mutual funds exhibiting high short-term performance. Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Jain and Wu (2000) also identify that the performance-flow effect is related to the marketing effort and media attention received by active mutual funds. Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) find that Jensen's alpha and flow is both significant and positively related for both mutual funds and pension funds. 4 leveraging this portfolio, the fund can increase the reported Jensen (1968) alpha without limit.
Evidence suggests that fund flows, and therefore fund incentives, are driven by short-term performance measures. 4 Perhaps concave portfolio strategies arise out of a necessary conflict between short-term performance objectives and longer-term portfolio performance considerations?
To examine this hypothesis, we need to look beyond returns to the holdings and transactions of the funds and the extent to which these correlate with the presumed incentives of the managers.
As a general matter, this information is hard to come by. Fortunately, there exists a unique database of high-frequency observations on returns, holdings and transactions of a broad and representative sample of Australian fund managers. Using this data, we see that the observed concavity of payoffs correlate strongly with the holdings and transactions of fund managers. We also find some limited evidence consistent with the view that these patterns relate to the incentive structures that the managers of the funds operate under.
In Section 2 of this paper, we clarify what is meant by concave payoff strategies and what they mean for standard performance measures. In Section 3 we describe the unique features of the high-frequency holdings and transactions database covering a representative sample of 5
The converse is also true: in the absence of private information, no globally convex portfolio strategy can generate Sharpe ratios in excess of the benchmark. This result can be demonstrated by showing that no out-of-themoney calls or puts held long will increase the Sharpe ratio over that of a LogNormal benchmark. In particular, implementing portfolio insurance using put replication must lead to a reduction in the Sharpe ratio (details available on request). In a private communication, Jon Ingersoll has proved that the same result generalizes beyond the LogNormal case, assuming complete markets and a representative agent with diminishing absolute risk aversion.
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successful Australian managed funds. Section 4 describes the results of our empirical analysis and Section 5 concludes.
Concave payoff strategies
Weisman (2002) uses the term "informationless investing" to describe any zero net investment or self-financing (in the sense of Harrison and Kreps (1979) ) portfolio strategy that yields a Sharpe ratio in excess of the benchmark, using only public information. When the benchmark is LogNormal, GISW (2002) show that the nonlinear portfolio strategy that maximizes the Sharpe ratio, and leads to an unbounded Jensen alpha, has payoffs that are concave relative to the benchmark. This result can be generalized beyond the LogNormal assumption, provided that the representative agent has a utility function displaying diminishing absolute risk aversion. 5 The term "informationless investing" is perhaps too extreme, as the concave strategy might be considered an overlay position on an otherwise informed portfolio. Such a position can be established by borrowing to invest in the benchmark while simultaneously establishing positions in derivative securities written upon the benchmark. Alternatively, it can be implemented by active trading that leads to similar payoffs. Examples of concave payoff strategies include, but are not limited to, unhedged short volatility trades, covered call writing programs and loss-averse trading of a kind normally associated with behavioral finance hypotheses. See, for example, Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997), Chen, Jegadeesh and Wermers (2000) and Wermers (2000) . Ferson and Khang (2002) develop and apply conditional weight-based measures to US pension funds. For an application in the Australian context, see Pinnuck (2003) .
6
However, a finding that fund returns are concave relative to the benchmark is a very weak test of whether traders consciously adopt concave portfolio strategies to boost short-term performance measures. On the one hand, while a particular portfolio strategy may generate concave payoff patterns and positive alphas, we cannot rule out the possibility that informed trading may also yield concave strategies and positive alphas. Long-Term Capital Management believed that the short volatility strategy was justified because, in their view, the options they wrote were overvalued but difficult to hedge (Lowenstein 2000) . On the other hand, if a manager were actually in the business of maximizing alpha by the use of a concave trading strategy, there may not be enough tail region observations to estimate the quadratic term in the Treynor-Mazuy regression with sufficient precision to conclude that the trading strategy was, in fact, concave. This is a limitation that results from only considering return information. Holdings data are generally available for US mutual funds only on a quarterly basis. While some very interesting work has been completed using these data, 6 In another study using the same database, Gallagher and Looi (2003) gain insight into the extent of the survivorship and selection bias by comparing the performance of the data sample against that of the population of investment managers that also includes non-surviving funds. Over the entire sample window, the average manager 8 investors. The resulting sample is a representative selection of some of the most successful equity funds in Australia. 7 This sample provides coverage of 28 individual investment organizations, which manage more than 60 percent of Australian institutional assets.
8 Nine managers were removed from the sample due to their back-office systems not permitting a complete extraction of both the relevant holdings and transactions data. To cross-check data provided by the managers, our study uses stock price information from the Australian Stock Exchange Stock Exchange Automated
Trading System (ASX SEATS). The ASX SEATS data are provided by SIRCA, and includes all trade information for stocks listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX).
Due to the nature of the collection procedure, several data issues are likely to arise, including survivorship and selection biases. Survivorship bias occurs when a sample only contains data from funds that have continued to exist until the collection date. As a consequence, if data from failed funds are not included in the sample, conclusions drawn from the pool of "successful" surviving funds will tend to overstate overall performance. Selection bias occurs when the fund sample contains data that have been selected for inclusion based on performance. In this case, it is possible that managers managing multiple funds may present information for their most successful funds, skewing the sample as a result. 9 While survivorship and selection biases are outperformed the ASX/S&P 200 index by 1.78 percent, with a standard deviation of 1.39 percent. While the average manager in our sample also outperformed the industry manger benchmark by 34 basis points, the magnitude of this outperformance is low compared to the dispersion of performance across management firms.
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GARP is a style of management common in Australia that can be defined as investing in stocks with good medium-term earnings growth prospects and which are inexpensively priced. This description differentiates this style of fund manager from a true growth manager, and the industry recognizes the brand is different from growth styles. 9 always an issue for performance studies of managed funds, they are of particular concern in a study of this nature, as the selection procedure would naturally exclude funds that experience extreme left tail events or that would otherwise fail due to the trading activities of its managers.
In other words, the sample is biased against finding evidence of concave payoff strategies that increase significantly the probability of downside return realizations.
In terms of market representation by funds under management (as of December 31, 2001), the sample includes 10 funds managed by five of the largest 10 fund management institutions, eight from the next 10 largest, six from the managers ranked 21-30, and the remaining 26 managers are outside the largest 30 management institutions. In terms of investment style, the equity funds are partitioned based on the manager's self-reported style using designations specific to the Australian market. These style classifications are "value," "growth," "growth at a reasonable price" (GARP), 10 "style-neutral" and "other." The latter style classification includes managers that do not emphasize a specific investment style (excluding style-neutral). In terms of the style representation across the sample, most funds operate using GARP (13 funds) and value styles (10 funds), while five and six funds follow growth and style-neutral strategies, respectively. We also include three index/enhanced index-style funds. Overall, our sample representative of the Australian investment management industry in terms of manager size and investment style.
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The Treynor-Mazuy measure was computed by regressing the weekly holding period excess return on each fund within the given fund classification on the All Ordinaries benchmark excess return and the benchmark excess return squared, allowing a fund-specific intercept and slope coefficient. 11 the credit spread was given as the difference between the maximum overdraft rate and the shortterm money rate.
Results

Return-based measures of convex payoff strategies
In Table 1 we present the summary statistics of the funds. Within this group there is a considerable variation in size, number of stocks held and turnover, with some significant outliers, notably funds 1 and 31. Fund 1 is a very active trader, while fund 31 does very little trading. The median amount of trading in the value style is less than that of the growth and GARP styles, consistent with the results of Ferson and Khang (2002) for US-based pension funds; however, the turnover and degree of variability of turnover appears to be greater within styles than in the United States.
We obtain some interesting results computing the Treynor-Mazuy measures for funds in our sample.
11 Table 2 presents summary measures of performance and concavity for funds in our sample based on weekly reported asset unit values broken down by style and fund characteristic.
Across all fund classifications, fund returns display a concave pattern of payoffs. However, certain styles of management exhibit more evidence of concave payoff patterns than others, with value and other styles having the largest and most significant evidence of concave payoffs. This
In Table 2 we report along with the Treynor-Mazuy (1966) a modified Henriksson-Merton measure given as the coefficient on a put payoff (as opposed to the more usual call payoff) in the Henriksson-Merton (1981) model, capturing the downside risk element characteristic of the concave payoff overlay strategies (see Agarwal and Naik 2004).
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The All Ordinaries Accumulation Index is the important benchmark for all funds (except the small-cap fund). The ASX and S&P revised the indices and the All Ordinaries Index was amended to become a 500-stock index from the first trading day in April 2000. The Fama-French (and momentum) results were obtained using a Carhart (1997) style four-factor alpha incorporating Australian domestic market, size, book-to-market and momentum factors.
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result also follows when we use option payoff measures of concavity.
12 Ferson and Schadt (1996) conjecture that significantly negative Treynor-Mazuy measures are due to failure to account for secular changes in the information set available to managers. Using the same instruments with Australian data made the coefficients reported in Table 2 more statistically significant (negative) than otherwise.
What is most interesting about this result is that the styles of management with the most concave payouts also had the highest alphas. This is true whether we measure alpha relative to the Australian All Ordinaries Accumulation market index or to Fama-French (and momentum)
factors. 13 It is also of interest to find that the funds that emphasize short-term incentives (compensating managers by means of an annual bonus rather than equity in the business) have the most negative Treynor-Mazuy measures. However, the sample is not sufficiently large to detect statistically significant differences across these manager characteristics.
An important caveat to these results is that Australian equity funds did not customarily report daily unit values until relatively recently. As a result, Table 2 reports results for only half of the funds in our sample, and not all of those funds had data covering the period for which we have This is a well-known issue with Australian funds reporting, and is a particular issue given the large openoption positions with stale or otherwise unreliable reported option values. We follow Pinnuck (2003) in determining returns to option positions using the ratio of underlying stock value to Black-Scholes values (calls) and Binomial values (puts) appropriately adjusted for dividends, multiplied by the option delta and SEATS recorded return on the underlying. The fact that we use constructed rather than reported returns may mitigate some of the problems reported by Edelen (1999), but timing issues are still of concern, and for this reason we emphasize the weekly reported returns over the daily reported numbers.
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holdings and transactions data. Table 3 reports results using weekly returns, computed indirectly from records of daily holdings (accounting for transactions) matched up to total returns as computed in the SEATS database.
14 We only include those securities that experienced at least one transaction per year, and so these results should be properly thought of as the returns to the traded portfolio. Evidence of concave payoff patterns now seems a little more widespread, with growth, value and other categories reporting significant negative Treynor-Mazuy measures.
What is really most striking about the results reported in Table 3 is that the measures of alpha for the traded portfolios are twice to three times the measures of alpha for the funds taken as a whole. This is true not only for the broad categories of funds reported in Tables 2 and 3, but also for the individual funds where we have an overlap of data. This is consistent with the findings of Wermers (2000), which show positive returns to trading activity beyond those that can be discerned from the realized return to the fund taken as a whole.
It is tempting to conclude from this evidence that the large and positive alphas reported by a number of successful Australian equity funds can be attributed to concave payoff overlay strategies. However, informed trading strategies may also lead to concave payoff strategies. In this context, it is difficult to claim that the return-based evidence supports the conjecture that many or most funds resort to concave overlay strategies to augment reported performance Table 4 as circumstances where the number of puts is less than or equal to the negative of the number of calls on the same underlying security at month end. An example is short volatility, where both options are held in negative amounts. "Concavity decreasing" positions arise where the number of puts is greater than the negative of the number of calls. concavity increasing in character. 16 In particular, almost all of the open option positions maintained by the enhanced index products were, in fact, concavity increasing. In addition, a majority of the option positions held by growth funds were concavity increasing in character.
The fact that so many of the option positions were unhedged short positions suggests that the funds were in fact attempting to improve reported performance numbers by concave payoff overlay strategies. This was particularly the case for the enhanced index products, where the enhancement appears to include short volatility trading. Prudential regulations limit the ability of fund managers to engage in concave payoff overlay strategies, but do not exclude the possibility that fund managers might achieve similar payoff patterns by other means. Increasing the position in a security as the value of the security falls and reducing the position, and perhaps selling off the position entirely, as the value rises will also lead to a similar payoff distribution. Behavioral theories of trading may explain why traders sell off securities to realize gain (Odean 1998); it is of interest to discover whether they also tend to increase positions on a loss. For each of the forty funds in our sample, we recorded for each security traded the value of each trade and the change in value of the underlying position since the last trade. We then regressed the amount of the trade separately on the change in value (if 18 We also controlled for involuntary liquidation of fund assets and net fund inflow by excluding from daily transactions the total net inflow to the fund apportioned according to the percentage of the fund invested in each asset as of the previous month-end holding period. As with all fund flow analysis, the results depend on accurate and timely recording of aggregate net asset values. However, the results were not sensitive to this adjustment and are not reported here.
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In analyzing the trading patterns of these managers, there was clear evidence of programs of trades defined as trading in a given security on successive days in the same direction and in similar amounts. As Chan and Lakonishok (1995) observe, this is a common pattern of institutional trading activity, and as in that study, we collapse these programs of trades into one trading event presumed to have occurred on the first day of the program of trades. 16 negative) and the change in value (if positive). We measured trading as the change in net position valued at the close-of-day price. 18 The coefficient on trading on a loss was significant at the one percent level in 13 out of the 40 funds. 19 Table 5 shows that the incidence of positive trading alphas was strongly associated with concave payoff strategies. This was true both measuring alpha relative to the market benchmark and using the Carhart (1997) model that incorporates both Fama and French (1993) and momentum factors.
There are several benign explanations for this empirically observed pattern of trading.
Perhaps the traders are responding to general economic conditions that happen to correlate with the price performance of the funds. We examined this hypothesis by including in the regression macroeconomic instruments suggested by Ferson and Schadt (1996) normalized by the prior fund value.
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This may arise through the use of long-term asset mix guidelines or through risk-management practices in Australian funds that restrict positions in the largest ASX traded stocks to double the current index weighting. This explains why funds may refrain from increasing their position on a gain. It does not explain why they liquidate on a gain, since in that event, the index weight rises and is therefore not a binding constraint.
Perhaps this pattern is an implication of the disposition effect of Odean (1998). To this end we
included as an explanatory variable the gain over a high water mark given as the current value in excess of the cost basis of the position (where this is positive).
Perhaps the funds in question are simply following a very conservative policy of rebalancing the portfolio when individual securities rise or fall in value, causing the portfolio weight to rise or fall beyond the portfolio manager's target. 20 We addressed this issue by first constructing a twoyear moving average of past security portfolio weights and including in the set of instruments both the positive and the negative deviations of the most recent portfolio weight from this moving average. The discrepancy in value between the most current portfolio and this average portfolio position did not explain a significant fraction of observed transactions and, in fact, the coefficients on positive and negative discrepancies were rarely of the correct sign. We must look beyond rebalancing behaviors to explain these trading results.
Perhaps the traders sell out on a gain in anticipation that the stock will fall in value, and increase their position on a loss given access to favorable information not generally available to the market at that time. This explanation would suffice to explain the results given in Table 5 , which illustrate that positive alphas are associated with trading on a loss. To examine this hypothesis, we calculated returns to a zero net investment trading rule that involves borrowing at the shortterm money rate to invest in stocks in proportion to the positions taken by the fund and selling
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This procedure is similar to the procedure used by Chen, Jegadeesh and Wermers (2000) to examine the value of trading, except that we have access to daily trades for each of the funds in the study. We also considered the case where the trading rule financed the purchase of stock through short positions in the ASX 200 Index and invested the proceeds of sales in that index. The results were unchanged. Across all funds, the trading return was 0.6 percent per month (t-value 2.40). However, limiting attention to those funds that showed a significant tendency to increase their positions on a loss, the trading returns were indistinguishable from zero, at -0.07 percent per month (tvalue -0.32).
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short positions sold by the fund, investing the proceeds at the short-term money rate. 21 All positions are liquidated after one month. Across all trades by all funds, we found that this trading rule was profitable, with an aggregate return of 0.72 percent per month (t-value 2.62), consistent with an informed trading hypothesis. However, when we confined attention to the funds that showed statistically significant evidence of increasing their position on a loss, the profits to this trading rule disappeared. The monthly return was -.02 percent, insignificantly different from zero (t-value -.04). Given this evidence, it is difficult to ascribe the pattern of behavioral trading to an information-based explanation.
While the evidence is consistent with a behavioral theory, which predicts trading on losses and locking in gains, the results in Table 6 show that concave trading patterns are particularly pronounced in certain styles of management and certain sectors of equity trading, after controlling for all other possible explanations. This is particularly true in the mining and minerals sector, where we would expect the greatest degree of informational asymmetry, and least pronounced in the industrial sector, where information asymmetry is small. Consistent with the results in Tables 2 and 3 , the behavior tends to correlate with characteristics of fund management. Table 3 shows that returns realized under the GARP and value styles of 22 "We decided to redouble our efforts around a few stocks that we knew were loved, just loved by institutions, betting that near the end of the quarter they would come and embrace their favorites and 'walk them up,' or take them higher in order to magnify performance. Pretty much everyone in the business knows that there are some funds that live for the end of the quarter. They know they can 'juice' their performance by taking up big slugs of stock in the last few days of a quarter" Cramer (2002) p. 147. In context, like other loss-averse traders, Cramer believes that increasing position on a loss provides the necessary market pressure to move the market in the desired direction. We are indebted to Jeffrey Wurgler for this reference. For further evidence of gaming performance statistics around reporting dates, see Carhart, Kaniel, Musto and Reed (2002). 19 management are concave relative to benchmark, and we find in Table 6 that the pattern of trading for these styles conforms reasonably closely to this model.
Concave payoff strategies seem to be most prominent in large funds with decentralized ownership and control. Examining the trading records of funds operated by the 10 largest institutional managers in Australia reveals significant evidence of these patterns, as does the data from funds affiliated with banks and life insurance companies. Funds where managers were compensated in the form of an annual bonus but did not have an equity stake in the business appeared to be the ones where this kind of activity was most pronounced. However, this evidence is by no means conclusive. In particular, it does not explain why domestically owned funds are more prone to this type of behavior than are foreign-owned funds, which presumably have more indirect management and control mechanisms. In Table 7 , a closer analysis of the domestic fund results reveals that the effect is most pronounced, both in terms of absolute magnitude and statistical significance, at the end of the calendar year and around the turn of the Australian fiscal year at the end of June, consistent with an attempt to window-dress the portfolio on periodic review dates. While simple return-based measures suggest that managed funds have negative timing ability, recent research in the hedge fund area shows that this evidence is also consistent with the use of concave payout overlay strategies. A recent paper by Goetzmann et al. (2002) suggests that these strategies increase short-term performance measures at the expense of increasing downside risk.
Prudential regulation limits access to these strategies for many managed funds. However, trading strategies that mimic these payoffs may explain apparent negative timing ability of many funds.
We examine this conjecture using a unique database of daily transactions and holdings by a set of forty successful Australian equity managers. We find that high alphas are associated with evidence of concave payoff strategies, and that these strategies are indeed associated with patterns of trading. While this effect seems most pronounced in large funds with decentralized ownership and control, our sample size is not sufficiently large to confirm that concave payoff patterns result from short-term incentive structures in the fund management industry.
High-frequency holdings and transaction data are not typically available to academic observers, and our results suggest that greater transparency might be an important objective for regulators, fund management, professional advisory firms and custodians. 
Bank or Life office affiliated
Alpha is calculated relative to the ASX All Ordinaries index returns in excess of the short interest rate, while Fama French Alpha refers to the Fama French (1993) model alpha plus momentum as in Carhart (1997) with factors recomputed for Australian data (t-values in parentheses). The Treynor Mazuy measure corresponds to the quadratic term in the Treynor Mazuy (1966) model, while the modified Henriksson Merton measure corresponds to the coefficient on a put payoff (instead of the more usual call payoff) in the Henriksson Merton (1981) model. The models are estimated using weekly holding period excess returns allowing for a fund specific intercept and slope with respect to the benchmark excess return. Returns were constructed from records of daily holdings and transactions matched against the total returns recorded in the SEATS database for securities in the funds that traded at least once per year of our sample period, with short interest rate given by the holding period returns on 30 Day Treasury Notes (data from Reserve Bank of Australia). Returns on option positions were estimated from Black Scholes values (calls) and Binomial values (puts). 
Month end option positions
This table gives the characteristics and number of option positions in each of the funds. The number of options is the median value of the ratio of number of options to the number of units of underlying stocks held by the fund, while the strike is the exercise price expressed as a ratio of the underlying stock price as of each holding date. The low strike price value of options held by fund 12 is explained by the fact that that fund held only two call options, each one of which had a one cent exercise price feature. "Concavity increasing" positions arise whenever the number of puts is less than or equal the negative of the number of calls on the same underlying security at month end. An example is short volatility, where both options are held in negative amounts. "Concavity decreasing" positions arise where the number of puts is greater than the negative of the number of calls. Only fund 4 held index options or options on index futures. This fund had an open short position in one Australian All Ordinaries index call option contract from December 1998 to March 2000. Chi square = 12.0109 (p-value 0.017)
GARP
Growth
Neutral
These tables report the cross sectional relationship between different measurs of alpha and the coefficient of trading on a loss in the regression of the value of trading and the change in value of the position since the last trade, where the value of the position has fallen. The measures of alpha corrspond to the fund specific alpha measures aggregated in Table 3 and computed on the basis of the returns on actively traded securities in each fund portfolio. "Negative" refers to coefficients negative and significant (on a two tailed test basis) at the one percent level, while "Positive" refers to coefficients positive and significant. "Zero" refers to coefficients that are not statistically significant at the one percent level. The Chi square test statistic refers to the standard Chi square test of contingency against the hypothesis that the incidence of significant alphas is independent of the incidence of significant coefficients on trading. 
